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THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO FAIR USE: 
AMENDING SECTION 107 TO AVOID THE "FARED USE" FALLACY 
Wendy J. Gordon and Daniel Bahls* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. A Wrong Direction in Fair Use Scholarship and Jurisprudence 
Under provocative titles like "Fared Use"1 and "The End of Friction,"2 
commentators argue about whether or not the copyright doctrine of fair use3 should 
exist in a world of instantaneous transactions. As collecting societies such as the 
Copyright Clearance Center have become more powerful, and technologies like 
cellular phones and the internet have made it possible to purchase digital copies by 
dialing a number or clicking a mouse, the suggestion is sometimes made that fair 
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1 Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights 
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998). 
2 Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the 
"Newtonian" World of On-line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130 (1997); see 
also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 
975 (2002). For a powerful presentation of the view that 'market failure' as a basis for fair 
use should not be limited to barriers between seller and buyer, see Lydia Pallas Loren, 
Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission 
Systems, 5 J. INIBLL. PROP. L. 1 (1997). For an interesting treatment that has some parallels 
to the discussion in the instant article, see Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing 
Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. 
L.REv. 1145, 1171 (2000). Other articles on the topic are cited as we raise various issues 
below. 
3 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (fair use allows the unconsented use of a copyrighted work). 
Developed as a judicial doctrine, fair use was eventually codified, although Congress gave 
ample warnings in the legislative history that judges should continue to develop the 
precedent and that the statute was not meant to "freeze the doctrine." H.R. REP. No. 94-
1476, at 66 (1976). 
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use could or should disappear. The Second and Sixth Circuits have flirted with 
foreclosing fair use if a licensing market is present or possible.4 The presence of 
"traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets," they say, counts 
heavily against fair use.5 The only exception, a later decision suggests, might lie in 
the ill-defined category of transformative uses.6 For exact copies, it seems, the 
presence of a licensing mechanism might be fatal to fair use.7 This is a dangerous 
direction for copyright law.8 
4 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1388 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (where, although noting that "the existence of an established license fee system" 
is "not conclusive," the court gave heavy weight to available licensing mechanisms); Am. 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[l]t is not 
unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment for a particular use tends to become 
legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the means for paying for such a use 
is made easier .... [A]n unauthorized use should be considered 'less fair' when there is a 
ready market or means to pay for the use."). 
On the dangers posed by this approach, see for example, James Gibson, Risk A version 
and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 931-35 (2007); 
Loren, supra note 2, at 6-7 (discussing the ability of copyright owners to manipulate 
licensing markets). See also Wendy J. Gordon, The 'Why' of Markets: Fair Use and 
Circularity, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 371 (2007), http://yalelawjoumal.org/2007/4/25/ 
gordon.html (commenting on Gibson). 
5 Texaco, 60 F.3d at 936. How heavily such markets should count is unclear. Some 
observers see "the absence of market failure" as "the conclusive rationale for rulings 
against fair use" in both Texaco and Michigan Documents. Ben Depoorter & Francesco 
Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 21 INT'L REV. L. 
& ECON. 453, 456 (2000). 
6 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614-15 (2d Cir. 
2006) (resisting the notion that willingness to license will always count heavily against fair 
use, but seeming to limit its new insight to cases of "transformative" uses). Admittedly the 
Bill Graham Archives court gives an immensely broad reading to "transformative"-it 
counts as "transformative" the exact but tiny replication of copyrighted concert posters in a 
book about the Grateful Dead. Nevertheless, the Bill Graham Archives court does not go 
far enough. 
7 But see Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1879-1903 
(2007); Pamela Samuelson, The Generativity of Sony v. Universal: The Intellectual 
Property Legacy of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1862-71 & 1873-75 
(2006) (discussing various kinds of exact copies that should qualify as fair uses). 
8 Copyright law needs to make clear that any reproduction-whether or not it can be 
seen as "transformative" --can potentially need and deserve fair use, despite the presence 
of an owner willing to license. 
On the importance that nontransformative speech can have, see for example, Rebecca 
Tushnet, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying 
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 546 (2004) (discussing the importance of exact replication). 
See also Wendy J. Gordon, Do We Have a Right to Speak with Another's Language? 
Eldred and the Duration of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 109, 127 (Paul 
L.C. Torremans, ed., 2004) (considering a music historian's need to collect exact copies of 
a song); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
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B. One Cause of the Wrong Direction 
Contributing to this dangerous direction is a set of beliefs we dub the "fared 
use fallacy."9 "Fared use" is use for which a license is purchased, and the fallacy 
can be defined by the following assumptions and conclusion: 
Assumption one: Fair use exists to assist copyrighted works to be employed in 
socially desirable ways that would not occur if the copyright owner's consent had 
to be sought. 
Assumption two: Any utilization of a copyrighted work that would generate 
social or personal value will occur in an optimal way if the copyright owner and 
the putative user are physically able to negotiate with each other in a setting where 
transaction-cost barriers between them are low. That is, if a market is physically 
available, imposing infringement liability on all copiers will not discourage 
desirable use of copyrighted works. 
Purported conclusion: Therefore, so long as a market can physically occur 
between copyright claimant and those who wish to utilize the work, there is no 
need for fair use. In other words, the argument runs: as technology makes more 
licensing markets possible, fared use displaces fair use. 
The easiest way10 to see the flaws in the fallacy is by examining its second 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1591 
(1993) [hereinafter Gordon, Self-Expression] ("Sometimes particular words are essential."). 
9 We call the argument a "fallacy" only informally: The problem with the argument is 
not its logical form (which would make it a formal fallacy) but with the truth of its 
premises. 
10 One can also dispute other aspects of the argument, including the first assumption. 
Matthew Africa characterizes the first assumption somewhat differently than we do. He 
attributes it to "the market failure theory of fair use" which he says "posits that the fair use 
defense should protect only those uses for which a socially beneficial transfer of rights 
would not occur absent a finding of fair use." Africa, supra note 2, at 1148. 
A note from Professor Gordon: Although I might quarrel with aspects of Matthew 
Africa's analysis of my work, I think his statement implicitly captures a difficulty in my 
early thinking. I may have had the illusion that "a socially beneficial transfer of rights," id., 
existed as a static thing: that the valuable downstream use was a kind of Platonic entity 
whose form and content would remain untouched by the process of obtaining permissions. 
One change in my perspective is an increasing realization that process matters. That 
is, I've come to appreciate more fully that the process of purchase can change the nature of 
what the downstream artist produces. This theme is one I have explored in several articles, 
see, for example, infra notes 22, 41 and 98), and that Daniel Bahls and I further explore 
here, particularly in our discussion of privacy, see infra Part V.A. 
There is often no fixed "use"-no final draft or disk securely hidden in a drawer-for 
which permission is to be sought. (Copyright law can treat harshly those who make their 
derivative works prior to obtaining permission.) A use-a parody, a quotation, an 
adaptation-may have no existence except as a set of possibilities in a downstream artist's 
future. To imagine that the artist's plans for using another's work will always remain 
untouched by the process of purchasing permission is a flat absurdity when one considers 
the complex nature of the creative process. 
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step, namely, the claim that so long as a market exists, optimal use of copyrighted 
works will occur. This claim may look plausible because it bears a superficial 
resemblance to the Coase theorem. However, the Coase theorem functions only if 
all transaction costs are absent, including the costs of monitoring all bargains11 (a 
matter which we address under privacy, below) and the costs that stand between 
the market participants and third parties affected by the transaction. 12 An absence 
of market barriers between copyright seller and licensee hardly assures the absence 
of other transaction costs and other forms of market failure. And if such costs are 
present, the law can and does make a difference in resource use. 13 
Moreover, the Coase theorem never purports to claim that all socially 
desirable uses will occur if transaction costs are absent; the theorem merely 
addresses efficiency.14 Even if the absence of transaction costs could automatically 
ensure efficiency, justice and distributional equity will not automatically follow. 
For these reasons, too, it will matter what the law does. Judges need to make 
normative choices even where licensing is available. 
The fared use fallacy accepts the notion that fair use is a legitimate response 
to markets beset by imperfection, but assumes that the only way a market "fails" is 
if the copyright claimant and the potential utilizer are blocked by transaction-cost 
barriers from being able to identify, contact, and negotiate with each other. In other 
words, under this misunderstanding, so long as some market exists-some forum 
in which buying and selling can occur-the market is not "failing" and judges can 
rely on private parties to spontaneously serve social ends. 
The interpretation is sometimes erroneously attributed to an article that one of 
us wrote in 1982. That article, Fair Use as Market Failure, 15 urged the courts to 
confirm that fair use was an appropriate response to situations where, if copyright 
were enforced over the contested usage, no licensing would occur and socially 
valuable use would decrease. 16 In other words, the article argued that the fair use 
doctrine embraced, inter alia, a user liberty to make exact copies when transaction-
cost barriers between user and copyright owner were so high that no licenses 
would be likely to result even if the copyright were enforced.17 
11 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (stating 
that the costs of contracting include the costs of "undertak[ing] the inspection necessary to 
be sure that the terms of the contract are being lived up to"). 
12 When a wide range of people are beneficially affected by a user's deployment of a 
work, transaction costs may make those benefits "external" to the user's licensing decision. 
For a discussion of the role that external benefits should play in fair use cases, see Loren, 
supra note 2, at 53-56, and Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural 
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1600, 1630-31 (1982) [hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure]. 
13 See Coase, supra note 11, at 19. 
14 Id. (placing "questions of equity apart"). 
15 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 12. 
16 See id. at 1620-21. 
17 Id. at 1618. 
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Such a "market barrier" rationale for fair use had been implicit in some earlier 
cases, notably the 1973 case of Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States. 18 In 1982, 
however, this implicit rationale had not yet been fully understood. For example, in 
1981, a liberty to make exact home copies was repudiated by the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, despite the apparent lack of any plausible route through which 
such home copies could have been licensed. 19 Therefore, it was important at the 
time to articulate that free use might appropriately be premised upon a consumer's 
inability to purchase copies through any plausibly convenient mechanism. But that 
1982 article never purported to displace the other justifications for fair use. (In 
fact, the article canvassed a number of fair use types to show how they 
corresponded to inadequacies of the market other than the inadequacy of 
"transaction cost barriers that prevent licenses.")2° In short, the 1982 article sought 
to secure a place for an additional fair use category, and show how economics 
could illuminate a range of fair use types, not to truncate any of the many bases for 
fair use. 
Nevertheless, a more overweening market approach has proved attractive to 
several commentators, who present transaction-cost barriers between cor yright 
claimant and potential utilizer21 as if they were the sole basis for fair use.2 Thus, 
as the internet and other licensing mechanisms now proliferate, some argue that 
fair use should correspondingly diminish.23 We disagree. One category of fair use 
does indeed become less necessary as transaction cost barriers diminish, but the 
18 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1353 (Ct. Cl. 1973), ajfd 
per curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). 
19 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 971-72 (9th Cir. 
1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
20 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 12, at 1629-33 (discussing, inter 
alia, externalities, nonmonetizable interests, and anti-dissemination motives). 
21 Obviously, transaction costs play roles beyond setting up barriers between 
copyright claimant and potential utilizer. Transaction costs are responsible for 
"externalities," including the positive externalities generated by some users (like teachers, 
students, and artists) who cannot capture in their pockets all the value they generate. When 
such a user is the defendant, the positive externalities she generates provide another 
possible basis for fair use. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 12, at 
1630-32; Loren, supra note 2, at 49-50. Our thanks go to Gideon Parchomovsky for 
reminding us to make this explicit. 
22 Exceptions exist, of course, including Lydia Loren's excellent article. See supra 
note 2. For Gordon's own responses, see for example, Gordon, supra note 4; Wendy J. 
Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always 
Been Only Part of the Story, 50 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 149-97 (2003) [hereinafter 
Gordon, Excuse and Justification]; Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual 
Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031 (2002). Also, for 
independent justifications for fair use, see for example, Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as 
Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 100-104 (1992) 
[hereinafter Gordon, From Feist to Fair Use]; Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 8, at 
1555-60. 
23 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 1, at 560-61. 
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need for fair use to address a number of other public needs remains as strong as 
ever. 
C. Our Goals 
In this Article, we suggest that the fair use provision, section 107, be amended 
to read as follows (with our new language in italics): 
§ 107. The right of fair use 
Notwithstanding other provisions of this title, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means [words omitted here], for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is a right and not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a 
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
( 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished or that a license is available for 
the contested use shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is 
made upon consideration of all relevant factors. 
Our primary suggestion appears in the last sentence of the proposed section 
107. We suggest that Congress make emphatically clear that the availability of 
licensing does not foreclose the possibility of fair use. In the process of arguing 
that point, we will discuss some of the bases for triggering a fair use analysis that 
exist independently of the presence of high transaction cost barriers between the 
copyright claimant and the potential utilizer. 24 
Secondarily, this Article suggests that the statute be amended to make clear 
that fair use is an affirmative right.25 This may seem unnecessary because the 
24 A preliminary catalog appeared in Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 
12, at 1627-36 (presenting the following categories: market barriers, externalities, 
nonmonetizable interests, noncommercial activities, and anti-dissemination motives). 
25 Prior commentators have also urged the recognition of "user's rights" in various 
contexts. See, notably, Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at 
"Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) (analyzing First 
Amendment basis for "right to read anonymously" and advocating congressional action to 
mandate an anonymity option within digital copyright management systems); Jessica 
2007] AMENDING SECTION 107 625 
statute already specifies that fair uses are not an infringement of copyright, which 
is equivalent to saying that fair uses are an area of liberty. In post-Hohfeldian 
terms, where there is no infringement, the copyright owner has "no claim rights," 
and the public has correlative "liberties."26 So the public already has liberty rights 
Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 52-53 (1994) 
(urging the reader to draft a model statute to safeguard, inter alia, user opportunities). 
Richard Stallman, in a piece of dystopic science fiction, even imagined a revolution 
premised in part on the desire to recapture for the people "the right to read." Richard 
Stallman, The Right to Read, 40 COMM. ACM 85, 87, reprinted in FREE SOFrW ARE, FREE 
SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 75, 77 (Joshua Gay ed., 2d ed. 
2004), available at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.html; see also Julie E. 
Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright I.aw, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 349 (2005) 
[hereinafter Cohen, The Place of the User]. 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly articulated fair use as a user's right. 
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. The Law Soc'y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13 
(Can.). This case is discussed further infra note 148. 
26 See WESLEY N. HOHFEID, FuNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN 
JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., Yale 
University Press 1923) [hereinafter HOHFELD, ESSAYS]; Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 746-47 (1917) 
[hereinafter Hohfeld, Judicial Reasoning]. Conversely, the copyright owner has "claim 
rights" in his areas of exclusivity, and in those domains the public has correlative "duties." 
See HOHFELD, ESSAYS, supra; Hohfeld, Judicial Reasoning, supra, at 746-47. 
Our use of terms is post-Hohfeldian in two respects. First, instead of "right" as a label 
for denominating the ability to call on the government for assistance, we prefer "claim 
right." Second, instead of "privilege" as a label for denominating the freedom from 
governmental control, we prefer "liberty." 
To explain the first terminological change, from "right" to "claim right": the ability to 
enlist governmental assistance is known in Hohfeld's system as a ''right." Recent 
commentators tend to use the phrase "claim right" instead, and we follow that newer usage, 
thus allowing us to preserve the simple term "right," with its rich connotative range, for 
more general applicability. 
As Hohfeld of course recognized, the term "right" standing alone has many meanings 
in the law. For example, Hohfeld distinguishes "rights" from "powers" and "privileges," 
yet the Hohfeldian "power" to contract is often known as the "right" to contract, and the 
Hohfeldian "privilege" of self-defense is often known as the "right" of self-defense. 
Hohfeld, Judicial Reasoning, supra, at 746-47. Therefore, we too will use the phrase 
"claim right" (instead of the simple term "right") to denote the ability to enlist 
governmental power. 
Regarding the second terminological change, from "privilege" to "liberty," Hohfeld 
used the term ''privilege" to denote an area where persons are free of governmental 
restraint. Id. He had in mind privileges like self-defense, which immunized an actor from 
ordinary tort liability. Id. More public-oriented privileges (like the freedom from 
governmental restraint embodied in the First Amendment) were largely outside Hohfeld's 
areas of doctrinal concern. Most of us would feel awkward calling something like free 
speech a "privilege" since the word ''privilege" connotes something that is extra or 
undeserved. We doubt Hohfeld intended his use of "privilege" to have such pejorative 
connotations-we see "privilege" as simply the word that came to mind given his doctrinal 
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of fair use. But that a liberty right exists at one point in time is no guarantee of its 
continuance, or that courts will give significant weight to the liberty right when its 
exercise is imperiled by newly asserted legal claims.27 This Article seeks to remind 
the legal community that fair use is a "right" in all these senses: it is an existing 
liberty, to which the public has an enduring entitlement, and which deserves 
significant weight. These are all aspects of what the public usually means when 
using the term "right."28 Therefore, having the statute explicitly label fair use a 
"right" has advantages: the nomenclature would emphasize that the liberty of fair 
use is an important entitlement under both our statutory scheme and our traditions. 
Courts in the preemption area sometimes have trouble seeing that fair use is a 
crucial part of the congressional balance.29 But fair use, of course, should play a 
role in preemption cases-when analyzing whether federal copyright preempts a 
contractual or other state law claim, the courts need to inquire into whether the 
state law interferes with congressional policy. 30 Yet courts sometimes construe 
areas of noninfringement narrowly as if areas of nonprotection were mere 
contexts. The word "liberty" is just as accurate as "privilege," and free of the negative 
connotation. 
"Privilege" also has another difficulty in the copyright context: historically, the term 
"privilege" in England referred to governmental grants-such as a royal monopoly to sell 
salt-that were awarded for reasons unrelated to creativity or invention. See, e.g., BLACK'S 
LAWDICTIONARY 1217 (7th ed. 1999). 
27 In addition, some commentators might object to terming fair use as a ''right" on 
varying other grounds. See, e.g., the sources mentioned in Africa, supra note 2, at 24. 
28 In this assessment of how "right" is understood colloquially, we are not following 
the Dworkinian approach. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 26, 193 (1977) 
(presenting rights as "trumps" and "principles" as having "weight"). 
29 Elizabeth M.N. Morris, Will Shrinkwrap Suffocate Fair Use?, 23 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 237, 268 (2007) ("[C]ourts should be able to use a 
preemption analysis to subjugate unfair license terms by determining that the fair use test 
of copyright law trumps the license terms of an adhesion contract. However, recently there 
has been a trend to uphold these adhesion contract terms."). 
30 This is a debatable proposition, because some courts seem to see a mechanical 
application of copyright's statutory preemption section, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006), as 
exhausting their preemption responsibilities. But other courts apply § 301 with an eye 
toward congressional policy, and also recognize that congressional policy must be taken 
into account even if§ 301 itself does not preempt. The latter inquiry is known as "conflict" 
preemption. Thus Maureen O'Rourke writes: 
Even if a particular [state] cause of action survives a§ 301 preemption analysis, 
it still must be evaluated for consistency with constitutional concerns because it 
still may be preempted if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress." 
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: 
Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 Duke L.J. 479, 534 (1995) (quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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exceptions and without significant importance to the congressional scheme.31 The 
"rights" nomenclature may be of assistance here. 
In addition, courts typically put the burden of proving fair use on the 
defendant32 because under the current language, fair use can too easily be classified 
as an "affirmative defense." Changes in the statutory language, such as we suggest, 
will allow courts to make more sensitive, policy-based decisions not only on 
preemption, but also on burden of proof.33 
We also suggest eliminating the first few words of the fair use provision, 
which currently reference "the provisions of sections 106 and 106A."34 These 
words, enacted prior to the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA), can be 
interpreted to exclude DMCA defendants from calling on fair use.35 The statute 
should not encourage a narrow reading of the fair doctrine's applicability to the 
DMCA anticircumvention rules. 
Our Article relegates our discussion of the DMCA issue to the footnotes. The 
proposition that fair use should apply (or does apply) to the DMCA has been well 
examined by others,36 and raises some complexities beyond our current scope.37 
31 For an example, consider Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). 
Bette Midler filed a state cause of action when the makers of a television commercial had a 
'sound-alike' singer imitate Midler's rendition of a particular song. The federal copyright 
statute denies the owners of sound-recording copyrights the ability to sue imitators, 17 
U.S.C. § 114(b), so one would have thought that copyright would have preempted Midler's 
state cause of action. Nevertheless, although the Ninth Circuit recognized the existence of 
the federal statute, the court gave the provision little attention and held the singer's state 
cause of action not preempted. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462. 
32 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994); Kelly v. Arriba 
Soft Corp., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Sandoval v. New Line Cinema 
Corp., 973 F. Supp. 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
33 See, e.g., Africa, supra note 2, at 1171 (suggesting "shifting the burden of proof to 
the plaintiff on the market effect factor" but also that "it would probably require a 
legislative amendment to the statute to effect this change"); Gordon, Fair Use as Market 
Failure, supra note 12, at 1624-26 (suggesting that once defendant proves market failure, 
"[t]he burden of going forward with proof of injury should then shift to plaintiff'). 
34 17 u.s.c. § 107 (2006). 
35 Although some judicial language can be interpreted to suggest that fair use would 
not apply in any DMCA action, at least one court has expressly left that question open. See 
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381F.3d1178, 1199 & n. 14 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (discussing and distinguishing prior caselaw). See also id. at 1212 (''The statutory 
structure and the legislative history both make it clear that the DMCA granted copyiight 
holders additional legal protections, but neither rescinded the basic bargain granting the 
public noninfringing and fair uses of copyrighted materials, § 120l(c), nor prohibited 
various beneficial uses of circumvention technology, such as those exempted under §§ 
1201 ( d),(t),(g),(j). "). 
Changing the language in section 107 could encourage experimentation to square fair 
use policies with anticircumvention policies. See e.g., infra note 37. 
36 Major sources are collected in Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & 
Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime To Enable Public Interest 
Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 
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Our focus is on two propositions: that "fared use" cannot displace all of fair 
use, and that fair use is a "right." These propositions are already true, already 
implicit in the statute, but need to be made explicit. 
D. Roadmap 
Our Article will begin by stipulating a definition for "market failure" as a 
triggering event for a judge to stop giving automatic deference to a copyright 
claimant. The Article then reaches into the core of Law and Economics and utilizes 
Ronald Coase' s classic notion of "reciprocal cause" to illuminate a crucial reason 
why all benefits should not be internalized to copyright owners. The Article then 
posits two potential fair users, one ·fully imaginary and one drawn from Bob 
Dylan's autobiography. We examine how these two people might fare under bases 
for fair use other than transaction-cost barriers between them and the copyright 
claimants. We first canvass categories of fair use already found in the case law or 
literature, and then offer two additional ways in which requiring purchase of a 
license-even if some licensing could occur sans transaction-cost barriers between 
the participants-might fail to serve social interests. The Article then addresses the 
terminological problem-fair use as a "right." Our Article concludes by returning 
to the amendments that we suggest Congress add to the Copyright Act to help 
courts safeguard the fair use doctrine. 
Remember, a finding of market failure does not mean that the defendant 
should win. It only means that we cannot automatically trust the copyright 
claimant's judgment and that the judge's usual rigid deference to the copyright 
owner should give way to a more flexible inquiry into the merits-particularly 
when it is not certain that the owner's claim rightfully extends to the disputed 
use.38 
2007) (manuscript at 3 n.15), available at http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/-pam/papers. 
html (follow the title hyperlink). 
37 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights 
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 54-70 (2001); Jane C. Ginsburg, The 
Pros and Cons of Strengthening Intellectual Property Protection: Technological Protection 
Measures and Section 1201 of the US Copyright Act, 10, 12-17 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 07137, 2007), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/index.html (follow "Columbia Public Law & Legal Theory Working 
Papers," then the title); Reichman et al., supra note 36, at 41-46. 
38 We are indebted here to Abraham Drassinower's notion of copyright's intrinsic 
limits. See Abraham Drassinower, Authorship as Public Address: On the Specificity of 
Copyright vis-ii-vis Patent and Trade-Mark, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming Feb. 
2008). 
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II. WHY MARKETS CAN BE USEFUL-AND WHEN THEY ARE NOT 
A. What We Mean by "Market Failure" 
For our purposes, a market fails whenever we cannot trust it as an allocator of 
social resources. The failure could be a technical failure, such as one arising out of 
the presence of transaction costs, strategic behavior,39 or income and endowment 
effects.40 Or the failure can be a larger matter, such as the inappropriateness of 
using market transactions in a given context. A comparative institutional analysis 
can show that, at least in some contexts, markets are a less appropriate way of 
encouraging creativity and dissemination than are alternative modes, such as 
informal norms of reciprocity or gift.41 In short, although economists use "market 
failure" in a narrower sense than that adopted here, we will employ the term to 
identify any characteristics that would erode the conditions under which the 
market's "invisible hand" will automatically direct resources as society would 
prefer. 
B. When Markets Are Useful 
Note that we emphasize the market's failure to "automatically" function in a 
desirable way. This issue is one of appropriate delegation. As Morris Cohen 
pointed out, property is an area where the government delegates some of its 
decision-making power--cedes some of its sovereignty-to the owner, a private 
party.42 
"Delegation of sovereignty" means that owners' decisions are automatically 
enforced, without judicial second-guessing. Such delegation of sovereignty-
deference to property owners--can serve efficiency because often private parties 
can employ local information to make decisions about resource use that serve not 
only their private interests but also the public interest in having resources valuably 
employed. In essence, when the market is working properly, private actors do a 
better, less-costly job of distributing resources than a typical government regulator 
can. The government can step back and allow property owners to do their private 
balancing of costs and benefits through decisions to buy, sell, and license, so long 
39 Some commentators would consider strategic behavior a kind of transaction cost. 
See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of 
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 82 (1994) ("[T]he Coase Theorem overlooks 
stratefiic behavior itself as an important transaction cost."). 
0 See infra notes 99-100. 
41 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTII OF NETWORKS, How SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOMS (2006); LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT: 
IMAGINATION AND TIIE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY (1983); Wendy J. Gordon, Render 
Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004) 
[hereinafter Gordon, Caesar]. 
42 See generally Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 
(1927). 
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as the market structure is serving the public interest. When market structures 
cannot be relied upon to promote social goals, however, this justification for the 
delegation of sovereignty also fails. The government then typically steps in to 
reassert its sovereignty, and has one of its agents (for example, a judge) weigh the 
costs, benefits, and justice of the disputed action. 
C. When We Cannot Trust the Invisible Hand, We Look More Closely 
Thus, as we catalog some of the many places where markets are inadequate, 
we are also cataloging reasons why automatic deference to owners' wishes-that 
is, delegating sovereignty to owners-is inappropriate. As was emphasized earlier, 
lack of deference to a rights holder's private decision-making is not the same thing 
as saying the defendant should always win. Rather, it means that a decision-maker 
other than the property owner should judge whether the public interest is best 
served by enforcing, or not enforcing, the copyright. The presence of market 
failure, therefore, does not trigger the grant of fair use to a defendant. It triggers a 
judicial examination of the merits.43 
In the language of the common law, the presence of market failure essentially 
transforms a "trespass" inquiry into a "reasonableness" inquiry. Thus, for example, 
when two drivers accidentally collide in the tangible world, their lack of intention 
triggers a judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of their behavior.44 
Reasonableness requires a decision by judge or jury as to the normative merits of 
the parties' behavior. 
In copyright, a quasi-reasonableness inquiry can be triggered by factors that 
are far subtler than a lack of intentionality. This should not surprise us. The 
copyright market is itself a compromise institutional solution. Plagued by 
deadweight loss, copyright markets are incapable of "perfection." Moreover, if a 
copyright owner makes the wrong decision, the stakes are particularly high given 
43 The merits include both the value of the contested use, and the appropriateness of 
defendant's decision to bypass the market. See Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra 
note 22. 
Note that fair use may involve judges in making some decisions that go beyond the 
standard Bleistein vision of judicial neutrality on aesthetic matters. Compare Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("It would be a dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.") with 
Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and the Parody 
Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q. J. 305, 312 (1993) ("[D]octrines of copyrightability-
notably the requirements for registration and 'originality' -have developed with an eye 
towards value neutrality. It seems impossible to remain neutral in the same sense when 
assessing whether a work is 'really' a parody .... "); see also Alfred Chuh-Yih Yen, 
Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998). Addressing this 
issue would take us beyond the scope of the current Article. 
44 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1127 (1972). 
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that free speech and democratic participation can be at risk.45 Additionally, unlike 
a stranger's unconsented consumption of an owner's scarce tangible property, a 
stranger's unconsented use of a copyrighted work might not cause harm to the 
owner. 
Moreover, the delegation (deference to owners) that one sees in the tangible 
realm should not be overstated. Nuisance law, for example, is often governed by 
reasonableness inquiries, even when the actors behave intentionally.46 In the realm 
of tangibles, when problems that afflict copyright arise-such as holdouts and 
other strategic behavior-the law typically responds with a lack of deference, and 
judges reassert the sovereignty of the government as the decision-maker.47 
Penalver and Katyal even argue that while a "delegation" architecture is 
characteristic of tangible property, an "anti-delegation" architecture is 
characteristic of copyright.48 So it is no wonder that, as compared with the yes/no 
questions presented by trespass claims over realty ("Did the defendant cross the 
boundary or did he not?"), fair use and cognate doctrines require copyright judges 
to engage in nuanced decisions that assess, on a virtually all-things-considered 
basis, whether the defendant has appropriately bypassed the market. 
D. Recap 
An owner's unwillingness or inability to license can trigger fair use,49 but the 
converse does not follow. The copyright owner's willingness to license a particular 
use does not necessarily mean that the copyright owner has a right to control that 
use. Even if an owner is willing to license, the law may give him no claim right to 
demand a license. On the contrary, the putative user of the copyright work may 
have a fair use entitlement. 
There are many places where, despite the potential for licensing, our society 
cannot afford to rely on an owner's self-interest to further the public interest. The 
copyright statute should make this even clearer than it already does.50 
45 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 V AND. L. REV. 
891, 948-49 (2002); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 
106 YALE L.J. 283, 285, 352 (1996); and the additional sources cited infra note 63. 
46 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 821B (1979). 
47 Holding out and other strategic behaviors motivate takings law-that is, the 
government's freedom to take property with compensation, but against the owner's will. 
48 Fair use is only one of the "anti-delegation" characteristics they see in coyright law. 
See SONIA KATYAL & EDUARDO M. PENALVER, PROPERTY 0UTI.AWS II: FREE(DOM) 
RIDING IN TIIE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9 (forthcoming 2008) ("delegation" 
architecture can be defined as a system of law which "delegates a variety of key 
gatekeeping function to the owner"). 
49 See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 12, at 1628-30, 1632-35 
(discussing anti-dissemination motives and transaction-cost barriers). 
50 We believe our suggested change in language is not necessary to give proper scope 
to the fair use doctrine. The language would largely serve as a reminder, making it easier 
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In this Article, we shall briefly recapitulate some of the well known (and not 
so well known) categories upon which commentators or courts have suggested fair 
use can be premised. Then we explore two considerations in depth. One, privacy, 
has been mentioned in the literature before, but needs further development; the 
second, 'packaging,' seems not to have been previously examined in the fair use 
context. All of the fair use categories are consistent with three recognitions: 
1. That copyright law employs the devices of property rights and 
markets to accomplish certain goals. 
2. That certain identifiable characteristics can, when they appear in 
specific cases, make markets less likely to accomplish these goals. 
3. That the presence of high transaction costs impeding bargains 
between copyright claimant and potential utilizer is only one of 
many such characteristics. 
Ill. "DOWNSTREAM" AUTHORS AS EFFICIENT DECISION-MAKERS 
The fundamental reason why broad fair use is crucial to both economic health 
and cultural flourishing can be seen in one of the articles that gave birth to the Law 
and Economics movement: The Problem of Social Cost by Ronald Coase.51 In that 
article, Coase criticized the Pigovian notion that all costs of a polluting activity 
should automatically be borne by the factory.52 Sometimes a factory can make a 
cost-effective reduction in pollution, either by adopting filters or by reducing 
overall production, but sometimes it cannot; sometimes the downstream neighbors 
could avoid the pollution more easily and cheaply, perhaps, for example, by 
hooking up to the city water system instead of washing their clothes in the river. 
To restate the Coasian lesson, taking it from the context of land-based 
nuisances like pollution, and adapting it to the new context of copyright law: Do 
not assume that the most obvious active party (the copyright owner) is the one to 
whom all the effects should be intemalized.53 Sometimes the downstream author or 
user is in a position to take value-enhancing steps, and she needs incentives to do 
for future judges to avoid the occasional errors of some past decisions that improperly 
limited fair use. But see supra note 33 (regarding burdens of proof). 
51 Coase, supra note 11. 
52 Id. at 12-17. Coase's ''theory of the firm" also has profound implications for 
copyright. RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 40--47 (1988). 
Using Coase's theory of the firm, Yochai Benkler argues for decentralized modes of social 
production. See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 
112 YALE. L.J. 369, 375-76 (2002). The classic statement of the opposing stance-arguing 
that many intellectual products require centralization rather than decentralization-is 
Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
285-86 (1977). 
53 See Wendy J. Gordon, Ronald Coase, in THE NEW OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 
(P. Cane & J.A.F. Conaghan, eds., forthcoming 2008). 
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so.54 Therefore, some privileges should be left to that downstream person; the law 
should allow the downstream person to keep some of the benefits, so that she will 
have incentive to take productive steps herself. 
Comparing the incentives for upstream and downstream actors yields one of 
the reasons copyrights expire. Consider the impact if Shakespeare's multitudinous 
descendants owned copyright in the plays. How would it have complicated efforts 
to mount West Side Story if Shakespeare's heirs had been able to capture much of 
the profit because of the play's obvious use of plot sequences from Romeo and 
Juliet? And what of Jane Smiley's best-selling novel, A Thousand Acres? In that 
book, for which she received a Pulitzer Prize, Smiley interprets King Lear in a way 
sympathetic to the ungrateful daughters: the father has indulged in sexual abuse. 
Conceivably, Shakespeare's heirs might have tried to suppress Smiley's novel.55 
And for what purpose would society give heirs such power? It is hard to imagine 
that the prospect of his family having infinite control over his works would have 
provided Shakespeare appreciable incentives.56 
The need to allow productivity to flower in non-centralized hands is not only 
served by the durational limit; it is also one of the prime reasons for the fair use 
doctrine. It would be a serious error to allow all benefits to be internalized by the 
copyright owner.57 
Copyright law imposes a loss of liberty with consequences that monetary 
payments may not satisfy. Creative production may need a kind of freedom 
inconsistent with the bureaucratic record keeping that licensing requires.58 The 
possibility of merely a monetary surplus may not be sufficient to encourage the 
kind of spontaneous play59 among second-generation creators that we need.60 
54 See Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright As Tort Law's Mirror Image: "Hanns," 
"Benefits," and the Uses and Limits of Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533, 535, 537 
(2003). 
55 See, e.g., Thomas Babington Macaulay, A Speech Delivered in the House of 
Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), available at http://www.baen.com/library/palaver4.htm 
(discussing the possibility that James Boswell's descendants might have refused to allow 
republication of the Life of Johnson). 
56 In fact, the issue of duration did not arise at all; Shakespeare's life predated the first 
English copyright statute. 
57 For some of the additional reasons why it is unwise to internalize all benefits to one 
party, see for example, William W. Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW 
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (2000) (discussing Glynn 
Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 V AND. L. REV. 483 
(1996)), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iptheory.pdf. Also, as 
Landes and Posner point out, every increase in this generation's copyright increases the 
cost of creating for the next generation, who must use what came before. William M. 
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 
325, 334 (1989). 
58 The need to obtain advance permission may "distort the borrower's creative 
impulse." Gordon, Caesar, supra note 41, at 82; see also Cohen, supra note 25, at 372-73. 
59 On the importance of play, see, for example, David Lange, Reimagining the Public 
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 481 n.63 (2003); David Lange, At Play in the 
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Also note that many forms of incentives and remuneration are possible.61 In 
emphasizing the need for downstream liberty-and the need for downstreamers to 
keep some of the benefits they generate-we hardly gainsay that authors need 
money to live. The question is not "money or freedom," but rather, what 
institutional schemes give us the best possible mixture of monetary incentives to 
create, and the liberty needed to create.62 Fair use, a tool for allowing flexibility 
within the dominant market model, is an essential part of the institutional arsenal. 
IV. A PAIR OF HYPOTHETICALS AND A CATALOG OF FAIR USE TYPES 
We proffer two potential fair users-a songwriter named Dylan and a scholar 
named Janine-and will refer back to their situations as we review various fair use 
rationales. As for the set of categories against which we will measure the potential 
fair users, it is best to begin with the Supreme Court's reminder that fair use has a 
constitutional dimension that sounds in free speech:63 Fair use constitutes one of 
the Copyright Act's ''traditional First Amendment safeguards."64 
Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate 
Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PR.OBS. 139, 146-50 (1992); David Lange, Recognizing 
the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PR.OBS. 147, 175-76 (1981). (Although this is a 
painfully unplayful footnote.) 
60 For discussion of how bureaucratic and monetary constraints can inhibit the muse, 
see, for example, HYDE, supra note 41, at 5. 
61 See Benkler, supra note 41, at 376, 433-35; Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for 
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 281, 324-26 (1970). 
62 Even the monetary issue leads to limiting copyright. See Landes & Posner, supra 
note 57, at 331-33. Securing monetary returns via copyright ownership increases 
incentives to one generation, but increasing those returns raises the costs of the next 
generation of creative persons too much. Id. In Strahlivetz's witty words, this "introduce[s] 
a useful sort of Laffer curve to the analysis of innovation policy." Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Wealth Without Markets, 117 YALEL.J. 1472, 1481 (2007) (reviewing Benkler, who made 
a point similar to Landes & Posner's). A better (if less witty) analogy than the "Laffer 
curve" might be Guido Calabresi's search for a system that minimizes the costs of 
accidents: as Calabresi emphasized, reducing one kind of cost (e.g., discouraging fast 
driving) often increases other kinds of costs (such as enforcement costs and pedestrian 
carelessness}, so the search is for a method of calibrating the interrelated cost-benefit 
functions to generate the highest net result. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: 
A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS passim (1970). 
63 The literature exploring the relation between the First Amendment and fair use is 
rich. See, e.g., Balcer, supra note 45; David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PR.OBS. 463 (2003); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within 
the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. (2001); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of 
Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALEL.J. 1 (2002). 
64 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) (upholding the Copyright Term 
Extension Act against constitutional challenge). 
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Thus, the Court views fair use as a "First Amendment accommodation[]" that 
is "built-in"65 to the Copyright Act and helps preserve copyright's constitutionality.66 
Although it is conceivable that in some cases the availability of licenses can satisfy 
First Amendment concerns, 67 this might not often be the case. When monetary 
markets cannot accommodate free speech interests, fair use must be available 
despite the presence of licensing markets. 
Fair use does not only render service where copyright claims threaten First 
Amendment goals. Other situations may be mishandled unless fair use is available. 
Of those already in the literature, we will discuss: patterns of creative production 
that are not consistent with bureaucratic behaviors; anticommons, hold-out and 
bilateral monopoly problems; distributional inequities; positive externalities; use of 
another's work not as expression but as a fact; use of another's expression as a 
means to access the public domain; and critical, nonmonetizable and/or "priceless" 
uses of copyrighted works. We also present two additional purposes that fair use 
may serve despite the availability of licensing: preserving an expectation of 
privacy and encouraging the development of efficient rights packaging. 
This list is not exhaustive. Some additional forms of fair use (such as using 
another's copyrighted work in self-defense)68 do not adapt well to our 
hypotheticals. But the many examples we do canvass should more than 
demonstrate that the mere possibility of licensing does not satisfy all the 
constitutional, social, and moral needs to which fair use responds.69 
65 Id. 
66 The copyright provisions challenged in Eldred were upheld in part because the 
Court felt confident that fair use could serve First Amendment goals: "[W]hen, as in this 
case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First 
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary." Id. at 221 
67 In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the availability of licensing 
constituted part (but not all) of the basis on which the Supreme Court upheld a state right of 
publicity claim against constitutional challenge. 433 U.S. 562, 573-74 (1977). The Court 
stated: 
Id. 
[l]n 'right of publicity' cases the only question is who gets to do the publishing. 
An entertainer such as petitioner usually has no objection to the widespread 
publication of his act as long as he gets the commercial benefit of such 
publication. Indeed, in the present case petitioner did not seek to enjoin the 
broadcast of his act; he simply sought compensation for the broadcast in the 
form of damages. 
68 See sources discussed infra note 141. 
69 Our strategy is not unique. For example, Mathew Africa and Lydia Loren give 
examples of situations where fair use is needed despite a possibility of licensing. Africa, 
supra note 2 at 1167 (discussing markets for criticism); Loren, supra note 2, at 47-57 
(identifying "societal benefits [that] are impossible to internalize in any bargained-for 
exchange between the copyright owner and the user".) 
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Now let us turn to the two potential fair users and their situations. The first 
situation is based on an event in the life of Bob Dylan. 
A. Bob Dylan Studies a Song 
Bob Dylan recounts how he took some of his early steps toward becoming a 
songwriter. Fascinated by the Brecht/Weill composition "Pirate Jenny,"70 
I found myself taking the song apart, trying to find out what made it 
tick. ... I took the song apart and unzipped it-it was the form, the free 
verse association, the structure and disregard for the known certainty of 
melodic patterns to make it seriously matter, give it its cutting edge. It 
also had the ideal chorus for the lyrics. I wanted to figure out how to 
manipulate and control this particular structure and form which I knew 
was the key that gave "Pirate Jenny" its resilience and outrageous 
power.71 
Let us assume that Dylan wrote down the complete lyrics and musical score. Few 
of us would think Dylan would have violated copyright in making these copies by 
hand.72 
Would our answer change if there were a website where potential songwriters 
who wanted to hand-copy lyrics or music could purchase a license to do so? 
70 1, I 
"Pirate Jenny" is a famously bitter song by Brecht and Weill. Written in the 1920s, 
and encountered by Dylan decades later, the song for Dylan was a new kind of experience 
that opened up a range of creative possibilities previously unglimpsed. See BOB DYLAN, 
CHRONICLES: VOLUME ONE 273-76 (1971). 
What we assume Dylan did-writing down someone else's text word for word-is 
neither unusual nor trivial. At least one English department regards as a "secret bible" the 
1920 book by Robert Gay, Writing Through Reading. Gay urges the rewriting of others' 
prose as one of the best methods for students to learn to write and read well. ROBERT M. 
GAY, WRITING THROUGH READING xvii (1920) ("Reproducing thought which you read has 
several definite advantages over original composition."). For some uses of Gay's work in 
the classroom, see, for example, http://www.yale.edu/ynhti/curriculum/units/1979/4/79.04. 
01.x.html. 
71 DYLAN, supra note 70, at 275-76. 
72 But see 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 13.05[E][4][d] (2007) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] (explaining that there are no 
reported cases determining "whether a single handwritten copy of all or substantially all of 
a book or other protected work made for the copier's own private use is an infringement or 
fair use" and arguing that although "force of custom might impel a court to rule for the 
defendant on the ground of fair use," that result "could not be reconciled with the rationale 
for fair use"). 
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B. Janine Studies Aristotle 
Our second, more ornate example comes from our imaginations, though we 
think it plausible. We posit a young scholar named Janine. Janine is preparing an 
essay on Aristotle's Poetics.73 Although she can not read Greek-she only 
understands French and English-Janine does not want to be overly influenced by 
any one translator's interpretation of Aristotle. To the contrary, she wants to be in a 
position where she can comment intelligently on the various translations that are 
currently influential in her field. 
As an initial stage in her research, she plans to make a chart showing 
alternative translations for every Greek paragraph. Accordingly, she pays for and 
downloads the major translations of the Poetics that exist in English and French, in 
electronic versions.74 One translation, we shall assume, is in the public domain 
because its copyright has expired. The copyrights in the other translations, we shall 
assume, have not expired. 
After Janine downloads the electronic books she reads each of them, at least 
in part, many times. She then uses the copy function to paste the full text of each 
into her word processor. In the process she loses the formatting and page numbers 
that had been in the uneditable version, but she does not mind. She can now move 
the English and French texts around, highlight what she needs to highlight, and 
insert comments as she thinks of things to include in her essay. 
She then copies the relevant portions of the many translations into a master 
chart, making sure to match up the varying translations in French or English with 
the corresponding Greek paragraph to the extent possible. Finally, she begins to 
73 We chose Poetics with malice aforethought. Our topic is the utility of copying, and 
Aristotle emphasized that copying and imitation ("mimesis") was foundational to all art. 
ARISTOTLE, POETICS, ch. 4, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2316, 
2318 (Jonathan Barnes ed., Ingram Bywater trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) ("Imitation 
is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, 
that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation."). 
74 When we mention the purchase of intellectual products sold for computers, we 
stumble into the area of things putatively controlled by various licensing agreements. 
Leaving the technicalities of contract formation aside, such as whether a click-wrap, 
browse-wrap, or a vaguely-co-exist-wrap license is properly accepted, we meet questions 
of how broadly copyright preemption should be applied. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). We 
later touch on the possibility that Janine has contracted away some of her fair use rights, 
but do so only briefly, infra note 122 and accompanying text. While we believe that fair 
use can play a role if copyright owners tried to limit Janine's rights by contract, fully 
exploring this role would take us outside the scope of this Article. 
For the moment, let us set aside the issue of whether contract or copyright should 
control in Janine's case. Instead, we can focus on the following questions. Assuming that 
no contract controls a particular use (whether from failure to form a contract, failure to 
plead a contract-based cause of action, silence of an otherwise controlling contract on a 
particular issue, copyright preemption, or any other reason) what are the respective rights 
and privileges of the parties? 
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write her essay, including in it many (duly-cited) lengthy quotations from the 
translations. 
None of Janine's actions, at first glance, seem at all unethical or unfair. As for 
lawfulness, clearly she is behaving lawfully when she copies into her word 
processor the translation whose copyright has expired, and quotes from it. 
However, the copyright law gives the copyright owners of the other translations an 
exclusive right of reproduction75 and of making derivative works.76 Copyright law 
might or might not prohibit her from moving the text into a word processor, from 
creating her chart of differences, from quoting from the translations she 
discusses,77 and possibly even from rereading the books too many times.78 She is 
making unlicensed79 reproductions of, and unlicensed derivative works from, 
copyrighted works.80 
75 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) gives copyright owners an exclusive right to copy. Moving a 
text to a word processor literally, if not in spirit, implicates this right, even if Janine 
destroys the original digital version and simply substitutes the new platform for it. First a 
copy is made in RAM, which many courts consider making a copy (despite legislative 
history to the contrary), and then she makes a copy to her hard disk. On the "right to read," 
we are indebted to the work of Jessica Litman and Richard Stallman. See supra note 25; 
infra text accompanying note 146. 
76 17 u.s.c. § 106(2). 
77 Scholarly quotation is well recognized as a fair use. Our angle of inquiry asks 
whether this well-recognized liberty should vanish if copyright owners stood ready to 
license it. 
78 Some commentators see an "exclusive right over reading" arising out of the 
conjunction of the reproduction right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), with a few court cases such as 
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991F.2d511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993), which have 
viewed making a copy into RAM (which a computer must do every time it reads a file) to 
be sufficiently nontransitory to constitute "copying" under § 106. Thus, even if Janine 
owns a digital copy of a book, it might constitute civil copyright infringement for her to 
reread it. See generally Litman, supra note 25 (discussing copyright issues raised during 
use of the Internet). Additionally, the "one read" license might not be terribly far away. 
Microsoft's Zune music player allows users to send songs from one Zune to another, which 
can then be sampled "up to three times in three days." Zune to Zune Sharing, 
http://www.zune.net/en-us/meetzune/zunetozunesharing.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). 
We can assume that each digital copy Janine downloads comes bundled with an implicit or 
explicit license to read it at least once-and probably more than once--otherwise nobody 
would buy it. See Yannis Bakos, Eric Brynjolfsson & Douglas Lichtman, Shared 
Information Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117, 142-44 (1999). However, if one book is licensed 
to be read five times (and to minimize the contract preemption issue mentioned in note 74, 
contains no provision expressly limiting Janine to reading it only five times) would a sixth 
reading violate the copyright law? 
79 Note that the word "unlicensed" in this context does not mean illegal or 
unpermitted. It merely means that the copies would not be made with the permission of the 
copyright holder. This Article investigates whether Janine needs the permission of the 
copyri§ht holder. 
8 If not for the fair use doctrine, copying and pasting would be a violation of the 
copyright owner's reproduction right. 17 USC§§ 106(1), 107. In addition, Janine will soon 
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Is Janine's behavior an infringement of copyright or is it instead lawful as a 
"fair use"?81 Should the answer change if the electronic book publisher is willing 
to sell Janine a license82 to make additional copies and derivative works?83 Must 
Janine pay these license fees, or is the publisher simply trying to sell her rights she 
already has? 
C. How Our Hypotheticals Fare 
In our hypotheticals, transaction cost barriers between the copyright claimant 
and potential utilizer are low.84 Nevertheless, both utilizers-Bob Dylan and 
be making a derivative work from each of those translations as she makes her comparative 
charts and inserts her various comments and changes. Id. § 106(2). Making derivative 
works is another behavior that the law appears to place within the copyright owner's 
exclusive ken. Id. If not for the fair use doctrine, this would be a violation of the copyright 
owner's right to make derivative works. Id. 
81 At least one court has indicated, in dicta, that some of these behaviors are fair uses. 
In a DMCA case, the court observed: ''The conversion accomplished by the [contested] 
program enables a purchaser of an ebook to engage in 'fair use' of an ebook without 
infringing the copyright laws, for example, by allowing the lawful owner of an ebook to 
read it on another computer, to make a back-up copy, or to print the ebook in paper form." 
United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp.2d 1111, 1118-19 (N.D.Cal. 2002). The Elcom 
court then went on to note that "[t]he same technology, however, also allows a user to 
engage in copyright infringement," id. at 1119, and upheld an indictment under the DMCA 
that alleged ''trafficking in and marketing of' the program, id., against motions to dismiss 
that had raised constitutional challenges to the DMCA. 
82 Suppose, for example, Janine copied the text of the first three books without any 
difficulties, but a window popped up when she attempted to copy the text of the final book. 
The window read: "Do you want to do more than read the PDF version you have 
purchased? If so, additional charges apply. The publisher has reserved its exclusive rights, 
including the right to make copies and derivative works. If your copy is exclusively for 
personal use, the publisher is willing to sell you a license to make additional copies for 
$1.50 per page. You may enter a credit card number below." 
The blurb in the window continued: "For derivative works recasting or transforming 
our copyrighted work, the price for each page used by you is $2.50, plus ten per cent of 
your gross revenues. For the preparation of derivative works, in addition to entering your 
credit card, enter the name of your project and the person in your enterprise capable of 
receiving service of process. We will contact that person once every three months to obtain 
progress reports and a statement of your gross revenues, if any." 
83 We might also ask about access restraints: if Janine's software prevents her from 
accessing this copy, is it unfair or illegal for her to find some kind of technological work-
around in order to get a text she can edit? If she modifies the access-control file, she may 
violate the DMCA's anticircumvention rule. See id. § 1201(a)(l)(A) ("No person shall 
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected 
under this title."). But see supra notes 35-37. 
84 Admittedly, in our later discussion, the possibility arises that Janine may find all of 
her digital books accompanied by confusing licensing terms. This raises the possibility of a 
new kind of transaction cost barrier: the time and frustration for Janine having to decipher 
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Janine-have good claims to fair use.85 First we will mention some bases for their 
fair use claims already found in the literature, and then advance two additional 
bases for fair use: encouraging the development of efficient rights packaging and 
preserving an expectation of privacy. Note that all these bases for fair use can be 
characterized as forms of market failure other than the presence of transaction-cost 
barriers between copyright claimant and utilizer. 
Let us start by canvassing bases already recognized in the literature. First, 
regarding Dylan, the bureaucratic process of obtaining permission is likely to chill 
creative experimentation.86 That means that the market may not be a good 
institution to employ here, and that instead the courts should allow a formal liberty, 
one regulated only by informal norms such as cooperative reciprocity or generative 
gratitude among artists. 
Second, if Janine wants to do a truly scholarly job, she needs to make 
reference to all the respected translators. This gives any one of them a potential 
hold-out power. Analogous to an anticommons problem, holdout and bilateral 
monopoly problems are potentially powerful bases for fair use.87 
Third, both Janine and the young Dylan are unlikely to have in their pockets 
money reflecting the ability of their use to serve social welfare. Both on 
distributional grounds,88 and on the ground that they are generators of positive 
externalities, 89 they may have claims to fair use. 
Fourth, the translations are "facts of life" in Janine's field, and her essay 
would not be complete without extensive quotation and analysis of the leading 
authorities. She should be shielded in her efforts to use facts, even when the facts 
are manmade.90 
such licenses--or the cost of uncertainty if she clicks assent without reading. Reading 
notices is something for which very few consumers have time. It strains cognitive and 
attentional abilities. Cf. Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive 
Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1206-57 (1994) (discussing warnings and notices in 
the product liability arena). 
85 In addition to the factors mentioned in the text, Dylan and Janine's activities are not 
likely to harm the expected, normal markets of the songwriters and translators, or their 
assignees. But since we are trying to break the circularity of the "licensing analysis," we 
will leave that out of the equation for now. See Gordon, supra note 4, at 371-76. 
86 Gordon, Caesar, supra note 41, at 89; see also Cohen, The Place of the User, supra 
note 25, at 371 (making the same point). 
87 On strategic behavior as a source for fair use, see Merges, supra note 2, at 133 
(noting that strategic behavior includes bilateral monopoly); Ben Depoorter & Francesco 
Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 21 INT'L REV. L. 
& ECON. 453, 458-59 (2002) (discussing holdout and anticommons problems). 
88 Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1535, 1539-40 (2005). 
89 See Loren, supra note 2, at 49-50; Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 
12, at 1630. 
90 See Gordon, From Feist to Fair Use, supra note 22, at 93-94. 
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As a matter of subject-matter classification, facts are not ownable under 
copyright, while expressive texts can be owned.91 But the same text can have 
different ontologies. What is communication of truth in one context, can in another 
context be a mere fact about what was stated. This is something that evidence law 
recognizes: it outlaws as hearsay only those third-party statements that are 
presented to prove ''the truth of the matter asserted." When third-party statements 
are presented for the purpose of proving other facts, evidence law treats them as 
nonhearsay. 
The fair use doctrine thus serves to honor the public interest in access to texts 
when they are acting not as communicators but as facts. When someone replicates 
a text that is ordinarily expressive not (or not solely) for its original 
communicative message, but rather to show that the text exists and to examine its 
impact, the fair use doctrine should be available to handle the crucial shift in the 
text's ontological nature.92 
And fair use does often serve this function. A newspaper was sheltered by fair 
use when it printed a copyrighted photo that lay at the center of a controversy,93 
and a litigant is generally sheltered by fair use when she makes copies of 
copyrighted documents whose content is factually at issue in the litigation.94 
Fifth, Janine is essentially seeking to understand an artifact of Western 
culture, the public domain text by Aristotle. She is like a programmer seeking to 
understand the public domain ideas within a copyrighted program: if the only 
practical way to gain access to the public domain is to copy, Baker v. Selden95 and 
the reverse engineering cases teach us that the person seeking a public-domain use 
91 17 u.s.c. § 102. 
92 This summarizes the argument made in Gordon, From Feist to Fair Use, supra note 
22. 
93 See Nufiez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2000). 
94 See, e.g., 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 72, at § 13.05[0][2]. This can 
extend to computer code. Tavory v. NPT, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 531, 538-39 (E.D. Va. 
2007) ("[T]he character of the use was not commercial, nor was the potential market for or 
value of the software source code impaired. To the extent that the code was reproduced in 
anticipation of or preparation for litigation, that use was a fair use and there can be no 
liability for infringement."). The court continued in a footnote: 
The Plaintiff has cited authority for the proposition that the use of 
copyrighted material in the course of litigation may fall outside the ambit of fair 
use, and thus expose the party who uses the copyrighted material to liability for 
infringement. . . . The Court does not presume to announce a rule that 
categorically shields litigants from copyright liability through fair use. But 
where, as here, the works produced before the Court are material to the 
litigation, and where the party offering production of the work has done so 
without notice or knowledge of another's claim to copyright, the equities are in 
favor of fair use. 
Id. at 539 n.10 (citation omitted). 
95 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879). 
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might be able to employ others' copyrighted expression.96 A liberty like the one 
allowed for purposes of reverse engineering in search of uncopyrightable ideas 
should be given, in at least some contexts, to a search for the meaning of public 
domain texts.97 
Sixth, Janine will be discussing some of the copyrighted translations 
critically. This obviously implicates nonmonetizable interests such as free speech. 
Further, the sale of "rights to criticize" could degrade the quality of criticism.98 
Moreover, permission to be criticized is a "product" that bears a high emotional 
charge, and we suspect that such goods are particularly sensitive to income and 
endowment effects.99 This is most visible at the extreme: someone who possesses 
the right not to be criticized might not sell it at any price ... but if he had to 
purchase the critic's silence, the price he could pay would be limited by his 
financial resources. 100 In such a situation, there is no neutral market that can reveal 
which use-the critical use or the silence-is more valuable.101 
96 See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding fair use for reverse engineering); Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 
203 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that intermediate copying that was necessary to 
access unprotected functional elements constituted fair use). The law of real property 
similarly creates rights to enter private land in order to reach public areas. See Wendy J. 
Gordon, Keynote, Fair Use: Threat or Threatened, 55 CASE WES1ERN U. L. REV. 903, 907 
(2005). 
97 Of course, there are additional complications to be investigated. Among other 
things, Janine has at least one public domain translation she can use, and she cannot call on 
the patent policies that probably assisted the defendant's reverse-engineering cases. 
98 See Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: 
Commodification and Market Perspectives, reprinted in THE COMMODIFICATION OF 
INFORMATION 149, 194 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel, eds., 2002) (making 
analogy to Titmuss's argument regarding the way that selling blood decreased the quality 
of the blood supply); Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 
67, 74 (1992) ("The social product is diminished if persons are able to exact compensation 
from truthful critics of their failings, for such a right reduces the incentive to produce 
truth."). 
99 On the income or "welfare" effects, see E.J. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on 
Externalities: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 18-19 (1971) (''The 
maximum sum [a person] will pay for something valuable is obviously related to, indeed 
limited by, a person's total resources, while the minimum sum he will accept for parting 
with it is subject to no such constrain."). Thus, "owning" a right increase one's valuation of 
it because the ownership itself is a source of value. See WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL 
ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE LAW 209-12 (2007) (using the term 
"wealth effects"). In addition, as a psychological matter, people tend to put a higher value 
on a thing they own than they would spend to purchase the same item. This is the related 
but distinct notion of "endowment effect." See id. at 212. 
100 On income effect and antidissemination motives, see Gordon, Excuse and 
Justification, supra note 22, at 179-83, 189-91 (discussing pricelessness and systemic 
effects); Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright 
and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1042-46 (examining the 
"economics of suppression" under the rubric of '"income' or 'wealth' effects"). See also 
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Ordinarily, economic analysts determine which use of a resource is most 
socially valuable by asking "what would be the outcome of a market transaction 
between different potential users." The person willing to pay the most is assumed 
to value the resource most highly. For goods affected by the income effect and 
similar phenomena, however, the market would reveal different results depending 
on the identity of the party to which the law awarded initial ownership of the good. 
As a result, a market transaction could not reveal with any stability which use of 
the good (the critic's use to criticize, or the criticized person's use to protect 
himself) would generate more value. 
Thus economic analysis joins free speech concerns in showing why a right to 
copy fairly lengthy excerpts for purposes of criticism is well established. As the 
Second Circuit has recognized, 102 and common sense suggests, even if a copyright 
claimant was willing to license critical uses at some price, that would not wipe out 
fair use for criticism. 
We could go on surveying the existing literature and case law. Instead, let us 
tum to two factors that have been implicitly taken into account by some courts and 
commentators, but need explicit recognition. The first category is the need to 
maintain privacy, which cannot be easily accommodated in individual deals 
between copyright claimant and utilizer. The second category is the need to keep 
rights packaged in a way that keeps information costs within tolerable levels.103 
Each category involves harms both to the potential utilizer, and to persons outside 
the immediate parties to the potential transaction. 
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 12, at 1632-35 (discussing 
antidissemination motives); Landes & Posner, supra note 57, at 359; Robert P. Merges, Are 
You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 
AIPLA Q.J. 305, 309-10 (1993); Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell: Parody, Fair 
Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79, 81-84 (1991). 
101 One might call the latter a ''pricelessness effect." See Gordon, Excuse and 
Justification, supra note 22, at 182. Admittedly, some might characterize the last-
mentioned argument as a kind of market barrier between copyright claimant and utilizer 
because if one party views control over the use as ''priceless," there will be no exchange. 
But we use pricelessness as an example simply because it is so dramatic. Income and 
endowment effects have a wide range of impacts on the licenses that are (and are not) 
reached. Thus, income and endowment effects can apply even when an author is willing to 
sell the right to quote him critically at some price; what is crucial to these effects (and to 
the way they skew resource use) is simply that for some things, the price one is willing to 
pay is different from the price the same person would be willing to accept if he were the 
owner. 
102 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614-15 (2d Cir. 
2006) ("[A] copyright holder cannot prevent others from entering fair use markets merely 
'by developing or licensing a market for parody, news reporting, educational or other 
transformative uses of its own creative work."' quoting Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol 
Publ'fc Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 146 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998))). 
03 We are indebted here to Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal 
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 
26 (2000). 
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V. Two MORE BASES FOR FAIR USE 
A. Preserving Expectations of Privacy104 
The ability to meter uses of copyrighted works finely comes at a cost to the 
privacy of the utilizer. 105 When a window opens on Janine's computer offering her 
a license to download, her initial thought process would probably be something 
like this: Who is asking for my credit card number? Is this message from who it 
claims to be from, or is somebody trying to steal my identity? If she is satisfied 
that the message is genuine and its sender is trustworthy, she still might not want 
to share information about how she is planning to use the copyrighted material. 
The purchase of such a license will leave a personally identifiable record of her 
'
04 We are not the first to notice that privacy has potential relevance for fair use. For 
example, a brief but stimulating discussion appears in Africa, supra note 2, at 1171, 1176. 
See also, e.g., Cohen, The Place of the User, supra note 25. Privacy issues have been 
prominent in discussions of management technologies, see, for example, Cohen, supra note 
25, at 1012; Electronic Privacy Information Center, Digital Rights Management and 
Privacy, http://www.epic.org/privacy/drm/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2007) (expressing 
concerns about various DRM technologies, including some that "phone home" to a central 
server), and in discussions of peer-to-peer networks. The Supreme Court may have had 
privacy concerns in mind when it gave fair use treatment to consumers who made copies 
for purposes of time-shifting their viewing of television shows at home. Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A 
Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1155 (1990). Our aims are to 
emphasize this strand of analysis in a way that will (a) show how transactions between 
willing parties can impose privacy costs on third parties, and (b) put user privacy more 
explicitly on the fair use agenda. 
Just as Brandeis and Warren suggested that privacy concerns play a legitimate role in 
common law copyright's grant of exclusion rights, we suggest that privacy can play a 
legitimate role in copyright's grant of public rights. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. 
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 205 (1890). For the point about 
Warren and Brandeis, we are indebted to Pamela Samuelson. 
105 See Cohen, supra note 25, at 1012 ("The freedom to read anonymously is just as 
much a part of our tradition, and the choice of reading materials just as expressive of 
identity, as the decision to use or withhold one's name. Indeed, based purely on tradition, 
the freedom to read anonymously may be even more fundamental than the freedom to 
engage in anonymous political speech."). On the value of privacy especially in the Internet 
context, see generally Julie E. Cohen, Copyright's Public Private Distinction, 55 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 963, 963 (2005); Julie E. Cohen, Overcoming Property: Does Copyright 
Trump Privacy?, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 375, 376 (2003); Sonia K. Katyal, 
Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 223 (2004-2005); Jacqueline Lipton, 
Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 137-38 (2004); 
Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1287 
(2000); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED Jan. 1996, at 135. 
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desired use. Beyond the usual concerns about embarrassment, persecution, 106 or 
undesired, targeted advertising, Janine might worry that such a license 
compromises any desire she has for secrecy in her work. She may not want other 
researchers to know what she is working on until she is able to publish it lest they 
preempt her work. If Janine decides to buy the derivative work license, she has 
functionally allowed the translations' copyright owners the ability to look quite 
closely at her current work. This secrecy concern might be heightened if she were 
a researcher racing for a patent, or a corporate CEO who did not want somebody to 
know that he had been reading a book with a title like Defending Against Hostile 
Takeovers for Dummies (or worse, that he had read the book three times and 
printed "Chapter 7: They'll Never Guess You're Bluffing!").107 
Consider the way that libraries refuse to give out their readers' lists of 
borrowing, lest borrowing be chilled.108 Similarly, sometimes an uncompensated 
106 Fortunately for Janine, researching Aristotle is not likely to get her on a no-fly list 
of any sort. However, her colleague doing research on the tactics of the Weather 
Undergound or the IRA might not be so fortunate. 
1 7 We should consider, briefly, whether Janine, the patent researcher, or the CEO 
might be able to take steps to increase anonymity. It is possible to imagine an intermediary 
protecting privacy just as Paypal might protect credit card numbers. To a certain extent this 
might work, provided people had the technical savvy to use it and were readily able to find 
a trusted intermediary. Still, the intermediary might be vulnerable to subpoenas, and we 
doubt that the necessary technology exists to guarantee full anonymity against 
sophisticated hacking. Moreover, Paypal and anonymity would hardly work where 
permission is sought to make derivative works. In such cases, copyright owners typically 
want to know the user's plans for the work. 
Mathew Africa makes a similar point in assessing the danger that "records of which 
articles a company was photocopying might be used by the company's competitors .... to 
deduce valuable trade secrets." Africa, supra note 2, at 1171. He suggests that even though 
the Copyright Clearance Center had made efforts to "mask" the names of copied articles, 
"a competitor might still be able to infer this information through careful study of [CCC] 
records." Id. at 1171 n.115. 
108 Forty-eight states currently have confidentiality laws relating to library records. 
American Library Association, State Privacy Laws Regarding Library Records (2007), 
http://www.ala.org/template.cfm?section=stateifcinaction7template=/contentmanagement/ 
contentdisplay.cfm&contentID=14773 (last visited Nov. 28, 2007). According to such 
laws, library records are to remain confidential and not to be disclosed except in very 
specific situations, including pursuant to an order or subpoena, see, for example, CAL. 
Gov'TCODE § 6267 (West 1995); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4509 (McKinney 2007), or when required 
to protect public safety, see, for example, TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 552.124 (Vernon 
1995). See also American Library Association, Code of Ethics, art. ill (1995), http:// 
www.ala.org/ala/oif/statementspols/codeofethics/codeofethics.pdf (stating the American 
Library Association's policy to protect each library user's right to privacy and 
confidentiality with respect to circulation records, as a matter of professional ethics); 
American library Association, Policy on Confidentiality of Library Records (1986), 
http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/statementspols/otherpolicies/confidentialitylibraryrecords.pdf 
(stating that such records are not to be made available except pursuant to an order or 
subpoena). We are indebted to the B.U. Law Library staff for this footnote. 
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use of copyrighted works should be deemed fair to safeguard the privacy interests 
of someone who does not want to leave the kind of identifying tracks that a license 
requires. It is true that Janine probably left a record with her purchase of the digital 
books. However, the supplemental license would require her to leave a record of 
the manner in which she is using them as well as possibly the nature of her 
underlying work. If she has a fair use liberty, she is freed of the need to disclose 
details she would prefer to keep private. 
Many market transactions come with privacy concerns. One might therefore 
object that privacy concerns cannot motivate fair use since privacy issues arise in 
all market transactions. Why would society worry about the market for intellectual 
transactions when society accepts the need to reveal private facts when people 
purchase things like contraceptives, pharmaceuticals, and life insurance? Point of 
purchase embarrassment may be a sort of transaction cost-but it is rarely a deal 
breaker. 
This objection has many replies. Most obviously, the tangible world also has 
legal protections for privacy. For example, insurance and prescription 
pharmaceuticals are subject to privacy policies and regulations.109 But in addition, 
the literature on free speech is full of reasons why markets in communication may 
stand in special need of the law's solicitude. Most notably, communication gives 
benefits to many people beyond the immediate speaker and recipient, yet the desire 
to communicate is more easily chilled than are other, more robust, material 
wants. 110 In addition, intellectual products are nonrivalrous, so when extra, 
uncompensated copies are made there may be no harm to revenue; moreover, 
markets for intangibles may impose more dead weight loss than necessary to 
generate incentives.111 
The narrowly tailored license could allow undesirable insight into the 
personal as well as the professional life of the potential purchaser. Traditionally, a 
book could be bought as a gift, as a coffee table decoration, to complete a 
collection, because the purchaser is friends with the author, or even because the 
purchaser liked the cover art. However, a license to read, reread, or copy could 
imply a stronger interest in the underlying subject matter. It might also reveal the 
time and location the material is being read. 
If that subject matter is "how to leave my job" or "how to get over my 
neurosis," those whom it would most benefit might be unwilling to leave a record 
of their need. To put it mildly, such reading is not something society wants to chill. 
109 And offline anonymity can often be preserved through using cash. 
110 We might imagine certain documents such as the Pentagon Papers that are 
protected by the First Amendment but where potential readers are worried that if they are 
traced as receiving and circulating the documents to others, they will end up on a 
government watch list. 
111 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without 
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive 
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1032 (1999) ("[T]he profits coming from the last 
increment of monopoly pricing impose disproportionate costs on society."). 
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We should also highlight that our immediate concern is the expectation of 
privacy as well as privacy in a particular instance. A reader might have a purely 
academic interest in the "how to get over my neurosis" book and, having nothing 
to hide, view the privacy cost only as a minor addition to a standard transaction 
cost. However, if this reader purchases a license it will shift the cost of maintaining 
privacy to the next reader, who in this case, may have the more socially valuable 
use. If privacy becomes something only maintained by those with something to 
hide, then an assertion of privacy becomes an admission of guilt. 
We worry about identity theft. We worry about embarrassment. But we worry 
most about the commodification of the most intimate, the most personal parts of 
our lives. Requiring a license for particularly private or personal intellectual 
exchanges raises larger privacy concerns.112 We use intellectual products both to 
understand ourselves and to understand our relationships with each other. Should 
the lover acquire a license before copying down a few particularly resonant lines of 
poetry in a letter? Must the children playing Superman acquire a license for a 
public performance of a derivative work? May the text of a wedding 
announcement or an obituary be copied into an email or scanned into the family 
computer? Because our lives are so seeped in intellectual products and ideas, 
requiring a license for all uses would raise privacy concerns unprecedented in other 
market situations. 
Privacy is a particularly pressing concern in artistic matters. Just as privacy 
may involve shielding one's actions from the eyes of others, it can also involve 
creating a personal space free from external influences. In the hypothetical 
involving Bob Dylan's creative process, and the early stages of his burgeoning 
creativity as a songwriter, a demand for a licensing fee could be particularly 
intrusive. For young Bob Dylan, paying a licensing fee to copy down a song would 
invite a licensing agency into his intensely personal struggle to define and 
understand himself as an artist. Nothing kills a dream like boilerplate. 113 
Finally, our privacy concern also extends beyond worries about specific 
transactions. By its nature, privacy must be protected at a societal rather than 
individual level. While Janine may not be at all concerned about her privacy, if she 
sacrifices it, she increases the cost to the next researcher who desires to preserve 
privacy. If privacy is readily commoditized, those who value their own privacy 
will be assumed to be hiding something. We suggest that privacy concerns might 
help to justify a finding of fair use, both to prevent the chilling of the use by 
privacy-valuing individuals and to protect an individual's right to seek privacy 
without stigma. 
112 Indeed, as we suggested above, one of the reasons society is willing to tolerate a 
loss of privacy in some market transactions is that many tangible goods have multiple 
possible uses. Nobody needs to know whether a purchaser of roses intends them as a 
centerpiece or as a gift to an illicit lover. With increased use of DRM technology and 
increasingly specific licenses, this anonymity is shrinking for intellectual products. 
113 Of his first contract, Dylan says he signed it without reading it. DYLAN, supra note 
70, at 280. 
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A liberty that needs to be bargained for may end up being used far differently 
than a liberty that is freely granted. A liberty that is freely granted as a favor may 
end up being used far differently than a liberty that is freely granted as an 
entitlement. And a liberty whose use is monitored may be a liberty that goes 
unused. 
B. Packaging: Preventing Slivers of Rights from Pricking 
Just as courts should take into account the privacy costs of denying fair use to 
a defendant, they should take ·into account the benefits of granting fair use to "trim 
away" undesirable restraints from awkwardly shaped packaging. One such set of 
benefits relates to standardization.114 
We address this in two contexts. First, we raise the possibility that courts 
should be more willing than they now are to use preemption to strike down those 
purported contractual restraints that violate congressional intent as found in the fair 
use provision.115 We raise that possibility only in a preliminary way, given the 
importance of the countervailing issues,116 but the preemption possibility needs at 
least to be mentioned in any discussion of standardization and fair use. We discuss 
preemption in regard to Janine, who may have (for example) assented to a contract 
that forbade multiple rereadings. 
Second, and with more certainty, we address the standardization issue in the 
context of unusual or unexpected assertions of copyright. Fair use can be used to 
help honor consumer expectations117 and prevent one unusual copyright owner 
from spoiling the profits of the group. We discuss this in the context of Bob 
Dylan's hand-copying the lyrics and music from ''Pirate Jenny." 
The growth of digital commerce has allowed intellectual products to be sold 
in previously unknown packaging. A copyright owner could, without too much 
trouble, sell a song that would only play on the sound system of a Cadillac driving 
114 As mentioned above, this section is indebted to the work of Merrill & Smith, supra 
note 103. 
115 See supra note 30. 
116 Merrill and Smith note that the costs of standardization in property-rights forms 
might be kept low by preserving the possibility of some workarounds. See Merrill & Smith, 
supra note 103, at 35 (noting, for example, that numerus clausus problems can sometimes 
be avoided by carefully rewriting leases). Our suggestion could limit the ability to do 
contractual workarounds. Nevertheless, the benefits of standardization need to be 
acknowledged, even if in the contract context the countervailing costs are also high. 
117 Customary uses have long been favored by fair use. For example, Africa suggests 
that one consideration the courts should take into account is, "Will [requiring a market] 
defeat the expectations of the public?" Africa, supra note 2, at 1176. But it is important to 
identify the dangers in relying on custom, see Gordon, supra note 4, and to be clear about 
what its potential benefits might be. What the instant Article adds to the discussion is a 
focus on the Merrill and Smith factors, in particular, the way that noncustomary packages, 
though perhaps agreed upon by the immediate parties to a transaction, can impose 
increased search and measurement costs on third parties. 
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between 75 and 85 mph on a Monday. With a bit more effort, the owner might find 
somebody who would actually buy this bundle.118 However, whatever benefit 
arises from such a transaction would be dwarfed by the headache to everyone else 
who now has to be careful not to accidentally purchase the Monday-Speeding-
Cadillac bundle. While many bundles are possible, not all bundles are equally 
valuable, and the more bundles there are, the greater the search cost to people who 
want to buy a specific bundle.119 Through fair use, a court can shape these bundles 
into more standard, readily recognizable forms. A court might determine that a 
sliver of a right, such as a right to reread or time-shift, should be sold with a copy 
of the work. This could curb the proliferation of nonstandard packages that, in 
addition to leading to unpleasant consumer surprise, can actually decrease the 
value of all intellectual products.120 Again, note that our primary concern is with 
118 Further, with some clever programming, he could ensure that the purchaser only 
listens to the song in the prescribed manner. While such strange arrangements were 
possible before the digital age, DRM has made such strangely tailored packages self-
enforcing. 
"DRM" originated as an acronym for "Digital Rights Management," although as 
Richard Stallman has pointed out, "Digital Restrictions Management" might be a more apt 
referent. RICHARD STALLMAN, Can You Trust Your Computer?, in FREE SOFIWARE, FREE 
SOCIETY: SELECTED ESSAYS OF RICHARD M. STALLMAN 117' 117 (Joshua Gay ed., 2nd ed. 
2004), available at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/fsfs/rms-essays.pdf. 
DRM refers to technological restrictions placed on computer media, typically to 
prevent unlicensed use of music. The goal is to manage consumers' use of digital media by 
restricting their actions to a subset of behaviors. Typically, computer code tells users' 
computers what the user is allowed to do. This usually means that behaviors the 
programmer expects and approves of will work fairly well, but that behaviors the 
programmer wishes to discourage, or which are simply less conventional and thus 
overlooked by the DRM architects, will be inhibited. Among other things, DRM may make 
it difficult for users to switch from one type of media player to another, or to change 
computers without losing the functionality of their files. 
The DMCA provides legal back-up to DRM. See supra note 35 (discussing the 
DMCA). 
119 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 103, at 24-40. 
120 Slicing rights thinly can be lucrative, but also destructive-not only to the 
copyright claimant and the potential utilizer but also to other copyright owners and 
potential users. Let us illustrate with an example from the physical world. A simple form of 
this example is suggested by Merrill & Smith's discussion on currency, weights, and 
measures. Merrill & Smith, supra note 103, at 48. 
When coins were made of uniform weights of gold, profit could be made by shaving a 
few grams of gold from one's coins, and selling the harvested gold separately. This practice 
was highly discouraged, both by custom and law. Yet if I own a piece of gold jewelry, 
property law suggests that I can melt it down and divide it into two pieces of jewelry if I 
wish. Why shouldn't I also be able to shave off a bit of my gold coin and put the coin back 
into circulation? After all, it is my gold. 
The answer is easy to see. We all know the problems that would arrive when I dump 
my diminished coin into the market. Let's say a coin that formerly weighed thirty grams 
now weighs twenty-four. If I shave this much off a coin, an astute purchaser will likely 
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harm to qther market partici~ants outside the transaction who will be inflicted with 
increased uncertainty costs.1 1 
Let us return to Janine and Bob Dylan. If Janine, in acquiring her digital 
books, entered into a contract that prohibits rereading one of her books, she and 
anybody she tells about her license now have doubts about whether other 
electronic books are rereadable. She will have to check more carefully in the future 
to ensure that the she is purchasing what she thinks she is purchasing. 
Additionally, if she ever hopes to resell any of her digital books in some form, any 
prospective purchaser will need to find a way to ensure that she actually possesses 
the rights she thinks she does.122 To avoid these problems, a court should consider 
using preemption to enforce fair use against those portions of Janine's contract that 
create the troublesome slivers of rights. 
Bob Dylan's example presents an analogous problem. Many commentators 
have noted that consumers being able to engage in multiple uses or in sharing can 
increase the value (and price) of copyright licenses.123 If Bob Dylan and other fans 
think they must ensure that they have explicit permissions before they can hand-
copy a song's lyrics, the value they will see in buying songs will decrease-as will 
the price they will be willing to pay. Thus, if most holders of music copyrights 
would freely allow lyric transcribing, a few spoilers could create uncertainty that 
decreases the value of everybody's copyright. 
notice something isn't right. Let's assume I even tell my purchaser-perhaps in very fine 
print-that I have shaved off part of the coin. The savvy purchaser should notice this and 
appropriately discount the value of my coin. The transaction is arguably fair, depending on 
our mutual expectations and the size of the fine print. But let's assume it's fair at least 
between myself and my savvy purchaser. 
I nevertheless have created some harm to others by shaving off my coin. I have 
devalued the worth of currency as an institution. Now every future merchant will need to 
weigh carefully every coin. Imagine the downstream chaos we would create if we gave 
change for a $20 bill by cutting off a proportion equivalent to $3.17 ! 
Even if I never receive any improper benefit from my coin modification, I have 
imposed costs on everyone. Now everyone has to buy a scale that's sensitive to minute 
variations in weight. If they don't buy scales, they will instead discount the value of all 
coins to reflect the possibility they've been shaved. The value of a coin in the marketplace 
is thereby diminished. 
121 In addition, of course, there can be harm to the participants themselves, but 
conceivably they can take care of the difficulties by explicit license terms. Third parties are 
not so easily protected. This is, of course, one of our usual themes: the possibility of some 
market between some of the affected parties does not safeguard all the people affected. 
122 See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and 
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 373 (2002) (recognizing numerus clausus in property law, but suggesting its root 
cause is allowing potential purchasers to verify what rights the seller possesses). 
123 See, e.g., Litman, supra note 25, at 46-48; Michael J. Meurer, Price 
Discrimination, Personal Use and Privacy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 
BUFF. L. REV. 845, 858 (1997). 
2007] AMENDING SECTION 107 651 
Fair use can also create consistency between old and new media. What rights 
come with a digital book? A court might approach this question by analogy. What 
is a digital book? It is like a book, but electronic. If a court sought to honor 
consumer expectations by giving a digital book a similar set of rights to those of a 
physical book-modified primarily by the necessities of electronic form- fair use 
would be one of the applicable tools for the court to apply .124 
In some cases, such as transferability, the peculiarities of the electronic form 
may suggest a slightly different default package. 125 But we suspect that the burden 
for shifting from a recognized form to a new form should fall on the party claiming 
that a use is unfair. 
VI. Tow ARD A THEORY OF PUBLIC RIGHTS 
A. The Need for a Theory of Public Rights 
The Supreme Court has proclaimed that the public has "a federal right to 
'copy and to use'"126 what the patent and copyright laws do not make exclusive. 127 
That is, the Court has treated areas where the legislature has refused to grant 
exclusivity as constituting an affirmative grant to the public of the corresponding 
liberty right, and has given that right to "copy and use" a weight sufficiently heavy 
that it invalidates or narrows state128 and federal129 claims that might interfere with 
it. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court restricted the potential scope of the 
Lanham Act (the federal trademark statute) to keep it from eroding the public's 
right to copy ·and use works of expression whose copyright had expired. 130 
124 As Jessica Litman has emphasized, consumers don't read and understand 
copyright statutes. Litman, supra note 25, at 51-52. 
125 There may be digital packages (for example, allowing primitive copying sans page 
numbers and formatting, but disallowing exact PDF printing) that maximize value for both 
producers and consumer. See Gal Oestreicher-Singer & Arnn Sundararajan, Are Digital 
Rights Valuable? Theory and Evidence from eBook Pricing, 2004 TWENTY-FIFTH INT'L 
CONF. ON INFO. SYSTEMS 533. 
126 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989). 
127 When the concept was born, the Court extended the treatment to copyright as well 
as patent. Thus, the Court wrote: "To forbid copying would interfere with the federal 
policy, found in Art. I, s. 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal 
statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws 
leave in the public domain." Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 
(1964) (dicta). To similar effect is Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-
33 (1964) (asserting that states may not per se prohibit the copying of articles unprotected 
by copyright or patent) (dicta). It was not until 2003 that the Court put teeth in the 
copyright half. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003). 
128 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 165 (preempting a state law that prohibited a form of 
copyin~ boat hull designs). 
12 Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 33-37 
130 Id. 
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These rights to copy are nowhere articulated as such in the patent or copyright 
law. Rather, they arise naturally where the domains of patent and copyright 
exclusivity end, 131 and are given strength by policy. 132 We suggest that fair use, 
which is articulated explicitly by statute, which has a long judicial tradition, and 
which has constitutional stature, be given similar recognition. 133 Further, as one of 
us has argued, the very "natural law" rights that are usually cited as providing the 
moral premise for an author's claim to reward also provide the premise for a strong 
set of expressive rights in the public. 134 
We need a comprehensive definition of the public's rights in the realm of 
expression.135 Ray Patterson, 136 Julie Cohen, and others have seen this as a need to 
131 All duties have correlative claim rights; all areas of no-duty are realms of liberties. 
See the discussion of Hohfeld, supra note 26. 
132 Whether a federal liberty is strong enough to withstand a newly made state statute 
or a newly asserted cause of action is a matter not of Hohfeldian definition but of policy. 
That a strong entitlement to copy does not arise from the mere fact of federal nonprotection 
is demonstrated by Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974). In that 
case the Court allowed states to prohibit some copying of secret but unpatented inventions. 
Id. at 491-93. If an invincible "right to copy" had followed from the mere fact that the 
inventions were unprotected by federal patent law, Kewanee would have gone the other 
way and preempted state trade secrecy law. The Court allowed trade secrecy law to stand 
because of a policy judgment: the states allowed copying by reverse engineering and the 
Court viewed this factor, among others, as sufficing to keep trade secrecy laws from 
significantly interfering with patent policy. Id. By contrast, a law that prohibited copying of 
publicly known inventions would interfere with patent policy, as Bonito Boats made clear. 
489 U.S. at 162. 
Our argument is, of course, that fair use is not merely an existing liberty, but is also a 
liberty that serves a strong policy: fair use is essential to preserving the balance that makes 
assertion of private ownership over speech acceptable. Without fair use, copyright would 
not only be constitutionally questionable, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 
(2003), and violate notions of justice, see Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 8, but also 
could impair the public's economic welfare, see, e.g., COMPUTER & COMMC'NS INDUS. 
Assoc., FAIR USE IN THE NEW ECONOMY: ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF INDUSTRIES 
RELYING ON FAIR USE 6 (2007), available at http://www.ccianet.org/art 
manager/uploads/l/FairUseStudy-Sep12.pdf (providing "an initial assessment of the 
economic contribution generated by companies benefiting from fair use"). 
133 The U.S. courts are beginning to recognize this. See, e.g., Chamberlain Group, Inc. 
v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (referring to "the rights that 
the CoRyright Act grants to the public"). 
1 4 Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 8, at 1536-37, 1555-72 (regarding the 
public's entitlement), 1577-78, 1592-96, 1601-09 (applying Lockean theory to provide a 
basis for fair use); see also Drassinower, supra note 38; Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-
Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 16 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 3 
(2003). 
135 See Cohen, The Place of the User, supra note 25, at 372. 
136 See L. RAY PATIERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A 
LAWOFUSERS' RIGHTS 191 (1991). 
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focus on the "users" of copyrighted works. 137 Th,at is a salutary starting place, 
particularly if one recognizes that authors too are users, 138 but the notion of "user" 
has implications that are too narrow. The public has rights in many capacities, not 
just as utilizers. For example, they may have rights as cocreators of the 
copyrighted work, 139 as harmed parties seeking redress through self help, 140 as 
holders of First Amendment free speech rights, 141 and as human beings. 142 
137 See Cohen, The Place of the User, supra note 25, at 348; Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 22 (2004). 
138 Cf Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. J. 965, 966 (1990) (asserting 
that no authorship exists without debt to predecessors). 
139 See generally LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT (2007) 
(arguing that the public is also an author); Daniel Bahls, The Fluid Text and Its Authors 
(May 20, 2007) (unpublished paper, on file with authors) (arguing that the public's 
authorial role continues through criticism, translation, and interpretation even after a work 
is first published). 
140 The best example is that of Jerry Falwell who, as part of a fundraising effort, sent 
his supporters copies of a copyrighted ''fake ad" published by Hustler magazine that had 
depicted Falwell in a degrading light. The Ninth Circuit wrote: 
[A]n individual in rebutting a . copyrighted work containing derogatory 
information about himself may copy such parts of the work as are necessary to 
permit understandable comment. Falwell did not use more than was reasonably 
necessary to make an understandable comment when he copied the entire parody 
from the magazine .... [T]he public interest in allowing an individual to defend 
himself against such derogatory personal attacks serves to rebut the presumption 
of unfairness. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986). From 
a Lockean perspective, the right to replicate another's expression in self-defense can be 
linked to the public's rights in the common. See Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 8, at 
1565-72, 1601-05. 
The First Amendment sharply limits the rights the government can give to private 
parties to obtain monetary redress for the harms done them by speech. Thus, in a 
companion case, Falwell was denied the right to sue Hustler for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988). But fair 
use and cognate doctrines-such as estoppel--only give liberties as redress: the ability to 
use speech as a form of self-help to fight back against the injurer. See Gordon, Caesar, 
supra note 41, at 83 n.30 and accompanying text. 
141 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 45, at 897-898; Netanel, supra note 45, at 348 
("[D]issemination of fixed original expression ... is a fundamental building block of 
democratic association."); Rubenfeld, supra note 63, at 3-12. 
142 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 A (III), at art. 
27(1), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), available at 
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html ("Everyone has the right freely to participate in 
the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement 
and its benefits."). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 
15.l(a)-(b), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S 3, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm ("The States Parties to the present Covenant 
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The current statute could be organized around the public's many liberty 
rights, but instead is organized in the opposite way: around a copyright owner's 
exclusion rights. That is, the statute could state all the things the public can do as 
the first order of business, and only as a second order of business identify 
exclusive right holders who have the power to unlock the gates to the things the 
public cannot do. 
The two forms of organization are analytically identical. In the graphic arts, 
foreground and background are drawn by the same stroke of the pencil. One can 
map an archipelago by focusing on the ocean and drawing where it ends, or by 
focusing on the islands and showing where they end. But unlike graphic art, words 
cannot simultaneously draw background and foreground. Something must take 
precedence in order for anything to be stated. 
The specification of a copyright owner's claim rights was placed at the center 
of the statute. This may have made sense as a matter of initial drafting strategy: 
Because the liberty to copy is assumed to be the background condition, 143 it is 
simplest to assume the sea of liberty, and spend one's words on specifying the few 
islands. That is the way most of us perceive law: as the exception, the places where 
we have duties instead of liberty. 144 But now that the copyright statute is 
immensely complex, the public, as the party least able to afford lawyers, should 
have a simple statement of what members of the public are entitled to. 145 
recognize the right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life; (b) To enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress and its applications"). 
Some philosophers distinguish between rights we hold because of what we do (special 
rights), and rights we hold because of our status as humans (general rights). JEREMY 
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRlvATE PROPERTY 106-24 (1988). Some fair use is premised 
on special rights, and some on general. 
143 Copyright and patent are seen as islands of protection in a sea of liberty. Whether 
the background really is a sea of liberty, however, is open to debate. See, e.g., J.H. 
Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a 
Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
475, 516--17 (1995) ("If, as the old cliche declares, the classical patent and copyright 
systems were once islands of protection in a sea of competition, the legal hybrids-taken 
together--conjure up the vision of a sea of protection in which intrepid entrepreneurs 
encounter remote islands of free competition."). 
144 This understanding is culturally based. An old joke goes this way: In the US, 
everything is allowed except if forbidden. In Germany, everything is forbidden except if 
allowed. In the USSR, everything is compulsory except if forbidden. 
145 See Litman, supra note 138, at 970-77 (discussing the complexity of the copyright 
statute). Jeremy Bentham apparently had a similar notion for legislation. In inquiring 
"whether the law should be expounded at length in a list of rights or a list of obligations," 
Hart notes, "The test which [Bentham] proposed was 'Present the entire law to that one of 
the parties that has most need to be instructed."' H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in 
OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (SECOND SERIES) 171, 190 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 
1973) (citation omitted). 
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B. Some Possible Rights of the Public 
What would be one such first order right? As Litman and Stallman have 
suggested, one such right should be "the right to read."146 Our gorge rises at the 
thought that we would have to account to someone else for our reading, or allow 
someone else to track what we read by forcing us to sign up for it. Because of 
technological changes, and some doubtful judicial precedent, browsing online is 
probably considered making a reproduction.147 As noted above, this act of private 
copying may trigger a prima facie duty to get permission first. 
If the statute were written with ordinary expectations about public rights made 
explicit, it would say something like: "no permissions needed for private reading." 
But such a sentence was omitted because no one would have imagined that such a 
statement would be necessary. However, technology changed, and the act of 
reading became something that might involve reproduction. So to guard against 
technology making further inadvertent incursions on public rights, the public's 
rights need to be made explicit. Fair use is a good place to start. 
For now, therefore, we make a modest suggestion: The statute should make it 
explicit that fair use is a "right." The Supreme Court of Canada has done no less, in 
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada. 148 As that Court writes: 
[T]he fair dealing exception is perhaps more properly understood as an 
integral part of the Copyright Act than simply a defence. Any act falling 
within the fair dealing exception will not be an infringement of 
copyright. The fair dealing exception, like other exceptions in the 
Copyright Act, is a user's right. In order to maintain the proper ·balance 
between the rights of a copyright owner and user's interest, it must not be 
interpreted restrictively. As Professor Vaver ... has explained ... : "User 
rights are not just loopholes. Both owner rights and user rights should 
therefore be given the fair and balanced reading that befits remedial 
legislation. 149 
It is overdue for our courts to do the same. 150 
146 See Litman, supra note 25, at 31-34; Stallman, supra note 25, at 75-78. 
147 This is the unfortunate legacy of a case with a different focus. MAI Sys. Corp. v. 
Peak Computer, Inc., 991F.2d511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993). See supra note 78. 
148 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc'y of Upper Can., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 
13 (Can.), at 1 48, available at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2004/2004scc13/2004 
scc13.html (emphasis deleted). For a stimulating discussion of this issue, see Abraham 
Drassinower, supra note 38 and Abraham Drassinower, Taking User Rights Seriously, in IN 
THE PUBLIC INIBREST: THE FuruRE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LA w 462 (Michael Geist 
ed., 2005). 
149 CCH Canadian, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, at <J[ 48. (quoting DAVID VAVER, COPYRIGHT 
LAW 171 (2000)); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 137, at 26 (asserting that focus on 
intellectual property rights favors proprietary concerns). 
150 They can and should do so without a statute, but a legislative nudge rarely hurts. 
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That fair use deserves to be seen a "right" -in the sense of an entitlement 
with a guarantee of continuity and sighificant importance-should be even clearer 
in the United States context. Not only has our Supreme Court declared that fair use 
has Constitutional backing, 151 but in addition fair use has played a key role in the 
development of United States copyright doctrine. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We would revise the current§ 107152 to read as follows, with italics indicating 
areas of change: 
§ 107. The right of fair use 
Notwithstanding other provisions of this title, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means [words omitted here], for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is a right and not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a 
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall 
include-
( 1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
151 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) (fair use is one of the Copyright 
Act's "traditional First Amendment safeguards."). 
152 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) now reads: 
§ 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In 
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use 
the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use 
if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
2007] AMENDING SECTION 107 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
( 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished or that a license is available for 
the contested use shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is 
made upon consideration of all relevant factors. 
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Our proposed modifications to copyright law would clarify that uses such as 
Janine's and Bob Dylan's would remain fair use even if a publisher offers to 
explicitly license them. 
As for the location of the change, it is logical to place it where Congress 
corrected the courts the last time they tried to artificially constrain fair use, namely, 
in the final sentence of § 107. In that sentence, Congress made clear that no one 
factor-there, the unpublished status of plaintiffs work-should be determinative.153 
We suggest a similar addition for the availability of licensing.154 
As mentioned, we adopt this agenda in part because some courts and 
commentators apparently believe that a§ 107 fair use claim should be denied if a 
licensing market for that use exists. This ambiguity, combined with a largely one-
sided interaction between savvy right owners and risk-averse, downstream 
producers, 155 has threatened to shrink fair use. The fair use provision of the 
copyright statute, however, is critical to copyright's ability to serve the social 
interest. 
We also suggest that § 107 drop its potentially restraining first clause, 156 and 
that it identify fair use as a right. These changes would further underline the 
importance of fair use, by making clear that it can play a role in cases involving the 
DMCA, that fair use is a crucial part of any conflicts analysis under preemption, 
and that the burden of proving all elements of fair use need not rest on the 
defendant. As the Supreme Court has said of the public's ability to copy 
unpatented inventions, the public's ability to "copy and to use" is a "right"157 that 
153 Id. ("The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if 
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.") 
154 We also changed the last two words of the existing sentence, to make clear that the 
four factors listed in the statute are not the only ones that matter. Decades of jurisprudence 
and legislative history have consistently indicated, that the four factors listed in § 107 are 
merely illustrative. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing factors to "include" in consideration of fair 
use); see also id. § 101 (indicating that, "[t]he terms 'including' and 'such as' are 
illustrative and not limitative."). See H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2555 (acknowledging that list in §107 is illustrative). 
155 See generally Africa, supra note 2, at 1172 (arguing that fear of liability warps fair 
use); Gibson, supra note 4, at 887 (stating four core uncontroversial premises). 
156 Deleting the first clause, "Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 
106A," is directed at DMCA concerns. See supra notes 35, 83. 
157 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164-65 (1989); see 
also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-37 (2003) (giving 
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cannot be lightly abandoned. Our Congress should explicitly declare that fair use 
deserves similar respect. 
federal trademark law a restrictive interpretation in order to avoid trademark claims being 
used in a way that would erode the public's right to copy works whose copyright has 
expired). See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text. 
